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Geographic Concentration

How reliance on one region can link otherwise separate services, and what a geographic view adds to a provider-by-provider risk picture across important services.

Published 26 October 2026Checked against the regulation text on 26 October 2026European Union (financial entities in scope of DORA)

The short answer

Geographic concentration arises when important services depend on one region, so that a regional event affects them together. The region might be where data centres sit, where network connections converge, where a provider's operations team works, or where a key sub-provider is based. The services involved may come from different suppliers and run on different systems, yet share a geographic weakness that links them during a disruption.

That shared geography is easy to overlook, because supplier names and system names differ. A geographic view corrects that blind spot by asking a simple question about each important service: where does it actually run, where is its data held, and where are the people and connections it needs? When the answers converge on one place, the firm has geographic concentration, whatever the contract structure suggests.

What does region mean in practice?

Region is not only a country name on a contract. It includes the physical location of data centres, the routes by which data travels, the location of backup facilities, and the location of operations and support teams. A service described as running in one country might depend on a data centre in another, or on a network hub that serves several countries. A meaningful geographic assessment therefore follows the service, not the headline location.

Backup arrangements deserve particular attention. A backup that sits in the same region, uses the same power and network infrastructure, or depends on the same operations team may not provide the independence it appears to offer. Geographic resilience depends on genuine separation: different infrastructure, different failure modes, and the ability to operate when the primary region is unavailable. Where that separation is unclear, the uncertainty should be recorded rather than assumed away.

What kinds of regional events matter?

Regional events can take many forms. A power failure, a flood, a severe storm, or a connectivity failure can affect facilities in an area. A local incident at a data centre, or a failure in regional network infrastructure, can have a similar effect even without a wider natural event. Regulatory or political changes affecting data transfer or service provision in a region can also matter, although they develop differently from a sudden outage.

The common feature is correlation: one event, several services. That correlation is the risk, not the event itself. A firm cannot predict every regional event, but it can understand which of its services would be affected together by a regional disruption, and it can test whether its recovery arrangements genuinely work from another location. That testing is where a geographic theory meets operational reality.

An illustration from insurance claims

Consider an illustrative insurer whose claims intake, document storage, and customer communication tools are supplied by different providers. Each provider might describe its service as cloud based, without emphasising location. On closer inspection, the claims intake and the document storage might both run from data centres in the same metropolitan area, using the same regional network provider for connectivity. A regional connectivity failure could then block new claims and access to existing claim documents at the same time.

For customers, that combination matters more than either failure alone. They cannot submit a claim and staff cannot retrieve the evidence needed to progress existing claims. A geographic map would have shown that link before the incident. It would also have prompted a question about whether a genuine alternative location exists for at least one of those functions, and whether staff know how to use it when the primary region is down.

How does data location fit in?

Data location is part of geographic concentration, but it raises its own questions. A firm needs to know where important data is stored, where it is processed, and where backups sit. That knowledge matters for recovery, because restoring a service requires access to usable data, not merely a working application. It also matters for understanding which legal and supervisory considerations apply, although this guide does not give advice on those questions for any particular firm.

Where data is replicated across regions, the firm should understand how replication works during a disruption. Replication that depends on the primary region being available may not help when that region fails. Replication to a genuinely separate region, with tested recovery, is a different proposition. The distinction is often found in operational detail rather than in high level descriptions, which is why geographic assessment benefits from questions about how recovery would actually proceed.

Primary sources on the record

Legal status: Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 in force; applies from 17 January 2025, with technical standards applying on the dates stated in each standard. Application position for this topic: Applies from 17 January 2025. Technical standards apply on their own stated dates.

Follow the service map

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